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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS
GIVEN IN ENGLISH TO RECIPIENTS KNOWN TO BE LITERATE IN SPANISH
ONLY HELD CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
Welfare authorities terminated plaintiffs" AFDC benefits.2 In
response, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin state
and county welfare authorities from taking this action. Plaintiffs al-
leged that notice s given in English to recipients who were known
to be literate in Spanish only' violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process and equal protection clauses. 5 The petition was denied
by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County and the California Court
of Appeal., On review, the Supreme Court of California held that
notice in English to Spanish-speaking welfare recipients was consti-
tutionally permissible. Guerrero v. Carleson, -Cal. 3d-, 512
P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
In attempting to define due process, courts have evolved three
distinct theories. The absorption theory incorporates into the Four-
teenth Amendment all specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.7 A
1. Three individual plaintiffs and a welfare rights organization were joined as plaintiffs
in this action. For convenience, plaintiffs hereinafter will refer to the three individual
plaintiffs only.
2. Aid to Families with Dependent Children was established by the Social Security Pct
of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 to -10, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 to -10 (1970), as amended
(Supp. I, 1971). It is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid
but administered by the states on a county level according to regulations of the Secretary of
Health, Education, Welfare. Categorical assistance, as contrasted with general assistance or
programs financed only by state and local governments, gives assistance to particular cate-
gories of individuals. There are several assistance programs: (1) Old Age Assistance (OAA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1970) ; (2) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971) ; Aid to the Blind (AB), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1201 et seq. (1970) (4) Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1351 et seq. (1970) and (5) Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (O SDI), 42
U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971).
3. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 requires timely and adequate notice to the recipient. Timely means
notice mailed fifteen days before further action is to be taken. Adequate requires that the
written notice include: (1) reasons for the proposed action, (2) right to a conference, (3)
right to request a fair hearing, and (4) the fact that if a hearing is requested, assistance
will be continued until a final decision is made. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10.
4. California welfare authorities make routine checks to determine if a recipient is liter-
ate in a language other than English. If a language harrier of this type is discovered, It is
noted on the recipient's file. Guerrero v. Carleson, --- Cal. 3d-, 512 P.2d 833, 834, 109
Cal. Rptr. 201, 202 (1973).
5. This casenote will deal primarily with the due process challenge.
6. Guerrero v. Carleson, 27 Cal. APp. 269, 103 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1971).
7. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Contra
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second theory, originating in Griswold v. Connecticu't," suggests that
a state cannot violate rights falling within the "penumbras" form-
ed by emanations from specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.9
A third theory has interpreted the due process clause to be a guar-
antee of privileges "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' 10
and a prohibition of state actions violating "fundamental fairness."' 1
The "fundamental fairness" doctrine balances the importance of the
right to the individual against the state interest.
12
Although debate continues over which theory should be applied
to the due process clause, 18 one aspect of due process, notice, has
not changed since the landmark case of Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co.14 Here the modern guidelines for adequate
notice were established by requiring notice to reasonably convey the
necessary information. The exact form it takes must vary with each
particular factual circumstance.15 In other words, the courts must
balance the state interest in using a particular type of notice against
the individual interests that may be harmed by the use of such
notice.
Procedural due process necessarily restricts the state from de-
priving individuals of benefits the state has previously provided them.
However, the recipient of such benefits must first establish a con-
stitutionally protected interest in those benefits before he can en-
joy such protections.
In Goldberg v. Kelly'8 the United States Supreme Court required
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Un-
derstanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); Frankfurther, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of
the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L.
REv. 746 (1965).
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally the Symposium ot the
Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
9. Id. at 484.
10. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
11. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1952). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Ste-
wart, J., concurring) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan,
J., concurring). See generally Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to
Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1962). For a discussion about
whether Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) overruled Betts v. Brady see Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211.
12. It has been suggested a similar analysis be applied to equal protection problems, most
particularly in the area of wealth classifications. See Michealman, Forward: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
13. In addition to the three above noted theories, the court has developed a hybrid test.
The test of selective incorporation confines the fundamental fairness doctrine to the Bill of
Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ; Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in
the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963). Note the "Death Penalty Case," Fur-
man v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). There were nine separate opinions. Though focusing
on the "cruel and unusual punishments" provision of the Eighth Amendmenti it does reveal
the more general problem of giving continuity to the vagueness of the Due Process Clause.
14. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
15. Accord, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1971) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969). While discussing procedures of welfare termination, the Goldberg court
stated: "[Tihe opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances
of those who are to be heard." 397 U.S. at 268-69.
16. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
RECENT CASES 135
New York to give fair hearings to welfare recipients prior to termi-
nation or reduction of welfare benefits. Cases following Goldberg
have stated that any analysis of cases involving a deprivation of
government benefits is a two-fold process. 17 First, the court must
determine whether a particular private interest is a "property in-
terest" within the meaning of the due process clause. 18 This means
that government benefits deemed not to be property interests, as
such, may be terminated without affording typical due process pro-
tections. 9 Decisions in this area are often controlled by the "right-
privilege distinction" which holds that governmental benefits are
privileges in which the recipient has no right and thus no constitu-
tionally protected interest.20 The Supreme Court in Goldberg re-
moved any such distinction concerning procedural due process mat-
ters involving the termination of welfare benefits. 2 Goldberg, as in-
terpreted in Richardson v. Belcher,'22 held:
[T]hat as a matter of procedural due process, the inter-
est of a welfare recipient in the continued payment of bene-
fits is sufficiently fundamental to prohibit the termination of
those benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing. 23
17. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) ; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
Richardson v. Perales. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
18. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (re-employment of college pro-
fessor absent tenure program not a "right") ; Morriseey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (a
parolee's protected conditional liberty"); Perry v. Sandermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (re-
employment of college professor where a de facto tenure program existed protected) ; Rich-
ardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (formal administrative proceeding in denying Social
Security benefits not required; this case was distinguished from Goldberg in the termination
of benefits involved an issue of credibility which an informal hearing could cure).
19. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (an alien did not have an accrued
right to Social Security benefits) ; Boggacki v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 3771, 489
P.2d 537, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1971) (a county building inspector for seven years had no con-
stitutionally protected right to maintain employment).
20. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271-79 (Black, J., dissenting) (1970) ; United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
21. Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, The De-
mise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 H-Av. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
22. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
23. Id. at 81. The court refused to extend Goldberg "to impose constitutional limitations
on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of entitlements to public
benefits." Id. at 81. However, the limits of Goldberg appear to be in dispute. First, compar-
ing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) with Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598
(1972) ; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), it appears that the distinction between
welfare benefits not being a fundamental right and the right to procedural due process in
termination of those benefits is critical. Secondly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
522-23 & nn. 17, 18 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, commenting on
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (importance of AFDE benefits) ; Kir v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 896 U.S. 554
(1970) (upholding a one-year residency requirement for tuition-free graduate education in
a state university) (equal protection) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the very
means of subsistence-food and shelter) (equal protection) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (the devasting impact of wage garnishment) stated:
These cases . . . suggest that whether or not there is a constitutional "right" to
subsistence . . . will receive closer constitutional scrutiny, under both the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses, than will deprivations of less essential
forms of governmental entitlements (emphasis added).
However, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972), the court held procedural
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Once a constitutionally protected interest has been established,
the court must exercise a Goldberg type balancing to determine
what procedures are required to protect that interest.24 Recent elab-
orations on Goldberg have balanced: (1) the importance of the in-
terest endangered, and (2) the appropriateness of the requested pro-
cedure, against (3) the state interest in maintaining the status quo.25
The importance of our social welfare system is evident in the
fact that for many it provides their only means of survival. 2 With-
out appropriate procedural safeguards, the recipient has no way of
protecting himself from "honest error or irritable misjudgment.
'27
Adequate notice is certainly a prerequisite to the defense of any
protected right.
Yet, opposing financial interests are almost always present when
a state is ordered to offset the impact of poverty.28  Such orders
often impose great financial and administrative burdens on the state.
29
In Carmona v. Sheffield,30 the court recognized that maintaining a
multi-linquistic governmental system would be nearly impossible.3 1
Not surprisingly, there are several California cases 32 holdifig that
due process requirements of Goldberg did not arise from the special importance of welfare
benefits or other necessities, but rested in principles applicable to deprivations of property
generally. Perhaps, the conflict can be explained in that Justice Marshall combined equal
protection and due process protections when each involve distinct tests. Equal protection
dwells upon classifications among individuals and the state's interest in those classifications,
whereas due process balances the importance of the individual right against the state in-
terest involved.
24. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The test the court stated
must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by the govern-
mental action.
Id. at 263, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
25. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) ; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) ; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971).
26. There were 1,060,800 recipients of AFDC payments in California in 1971 alone. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1972 (93 ed.), Table 188,
at 900. It is conceivable a person could depend upon government for his income (42
U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971)), for his medical care (42 U.S.C.
§§ 1381 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971)), for his food (7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 t seq.
(1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972)), and for his housing (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et
seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971) ).
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
28. State and local expenditures for public assistance programs in the United States in
1971 were over $8.7 billion. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1972 (93 ed.), Table 452, at 279.
29. See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 151, 161
n.38 (1957). It cost the state of Illinois an additional $250,000 to provide transcripts of
trial records to indigents on appeal.
30. Carmona v. Sheffied, 325 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd 475 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1973).
31. Id. The court held that the costs of a multi-linguistic system were
so staggering as virtually to constitute its own refutation. . . . ilt would vir-
tually cause the processes of government to grind to a halt. . . . [T]he Courts
and administrative agencies would become all but impossible.
Id. at 1342.
32. In addition to Guerrero: Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (over-
riding requests for unemployment insurance communications to be In Spanish); Castro v.
State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970) (not requiring ballots to be
printed in Spanish).
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"the state interest .in maintaining a single language system is sub-
stantial."3
Guerrero v. Carleson,8" Carmona v. Sheffield, and Castro v.
State0 approached the balancing problem almost identically. The
courts noted that the state had an interest in maintaining a single
language system in order to avoid increased administrative burdens
and costs involved in a multi-linquistic system. 87 However, such
grounds alone are not sufficient to modify due process protection to
welfare recipients.8 8 For this reason the courts placed great empha-
sis on the importance the benefits played in the recipient's lives."
Taking into account the importance of these rights, the court
raised an assumption in the instant case. Even though the recipients
of the notice could not understand what was sent to them, the court
assumed that the recipients would intuitively realize that it was im-
portant 0  and that they would go out and seek an interpretation."
1
The court's faith in this self-initiated action by the recipient was the
crux of its argument in Guerrero and an earlier case, Castro v.
State.4
2
The court's assumption appears to raise several questions. First,
placing upon the recipient the burden of discovering what has been
sent to him does not seem to be "notice reasonably calculated, under
all circumstances, to apprise interest parties of the pendency of the
action. . .. ,,41 Secondly, two writers, commenting on welfare ter-
38. Guerrero at 203, quoting Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 242. 466 P.2d 244, 258, 85
Cal. Rptr. 20, 34 (1970).
84. --- Cal. 3d- , 612 P.2d 833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
35. 475 F.2d 738 (9th' Cir. 1973).
36. 2 Cal. 3d 22, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
37. Early decisions discussed the Americanization of "foreigners" to avert their following
foreign leaders in a coup d' etat of the American government. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
38. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) required New York to provide pretermination
hearings because
[t]he interest of the eligible recipient in uninterruptive receipt of public as-
sistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously
tei minated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any in-
crease in its fiscal and administrative burdens.
Id. at 266. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1971) ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 894
U.S. 618, 627-31 (1969) (equal protection). Furthermore, New York was financially and
administratively able to employ both a letter and a personal conference with a caseworker
before termination of benefits occurred.
39. Guerrero v. Carleson, - Cal. 3d-, 512 P.2d 833, 836-37, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05
(1973) (welfare benefits) ; Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
alf'd 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973) (unemployment insurance) ; Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d
223, 242, 466 P.2d 244, 248, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 34 (1970) (the vote).
40. In support of the validity of its assumption the court said:
[E]ach [notice] is . . . printed on letterhead of the Department of Social Serv-
ices of Los Angeles County; each is . . . personally addressed to the individual
plaintiff, by home address, and case number; each is obviously an official com-
munication, with boxes checked and blanks filled in by hand. . . . (emphasis
added).
Guerrero at 204.
41. Evidence showed that two of the plaintiffs did in fact seek out and receive adequate
interpretations. Guerrero at 204 nn.7, 8.
42. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
43. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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mination hearings, contend that "the prosecution of an appeal de-
mands a degree of security, awareness, tenacity, and ability which
few dependent people have."4 Although these remarks refer to the
hearing itself, the personality characteristics appear to be equally
applicable to initiating the search for an interpretation of a letter
of unknown content. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated: "[To]
the welfare recipient whose benefit has been sharply reduced .. .
such action often appears as mysterious as it is sudden, as arbi-
trary as it is disastrous. ' '41
Finally, pretermination notices need not be considered formal
or official state communications.4 6  Pretermination hearings need
not be of judicial or quasi-judicial character, but should be formal
enough to produce an initial determination of the validity of the wel-
fare department's accusations. 47 If a formal judicial or quasi-judi-
cial hearing need not be held, the notice of the right to request such
a hearing should not be considered a formal communication. Since
much correspondence between the welfare authorities and the re-
cipients was done in Spanish, pretermination notices in minority
languages should not be considered a significant extension of exist-
ing practices so as to endanger the state's official language.
Since the New Deal era, a significant segment of the population
has become dependent upon social welfare.4 8 The poor more than
any other group rely upon the government49 for the basic necessi-
ties of life.5 0 Since they rely to such a great extent on the govern-
ment, any adverse governmental action will necessarily have a mag-
nified effect on the poor. 51 When the individual recipient has so much
at stake, the extended effort requested from the state seems hardly
to tip the judicial scales in favor of the state.
Goldberg held that the opportunity to a fair hearing was funda-
mental to the welfare recipient who must deal with government and
44. Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CAL. L. REv. 326, 342 (1966).
(196.6).
45. Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425, 441.
46. When the court refers to maintaining a single language, it must be assumed they are
referring to the official language of the state government in its functional communications.
47. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Accord, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S 337, 342-44 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389 (1971).
48. There were 1,060,800 recipients of AFDC payments in California in 1971 alone. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1972 (93 ed.), Table 488.
at 300.
49. Professor Reich in his article The Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), describes the
growth of government benefits and its distribution capabilities as creating a "new property"
derived from benefits and rights doled out by government.
50. It Is conceivable a person could depend upon government for his income (42 U.S.C.
§ 601 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971)), for his medical care (42 U.S.C. §§
1381 et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. I, 1971)), for his food (7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq.
(1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972)), and for his housing (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401
et seq. (1970), as amended ASupp. I, 1971)).
51. See generally Dooley & Goldberg, The Search for Due Process in the Administra-
tion of Social Welfare Programs, 47 N.D. L REv. 209 (1971).
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its vast bureaucracy. To permit notice of such an opportunity to be
given in a language not understandable to the recipient makes Gold-
berg a pyrrhic victory for the administration of justice. Such pro-
cedures lend support to words of the late Robert F. Kennedy when
he said "there is a reason why the 'poor man looks upon the law
as an enemy . .. For him the law is always taking something
away'."52
JOHN HOLM
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GUEST STATUTE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW
Plaintiff, an automobile guest, brought a negligence action
against his host to recover for injuries that he suffered when his host's
automobile crossed the center line of a public highway and collided
with an embankment on the opposite side of the road. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plain-
tiff appealed asserting that the guest statute1 was an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court of
California, reversing the lower court's decision, held that the guest
statute2 violated the equal protection guarantees of the California
Constitution3 and the United States Constitution because it created
classifications of automobile guests which did not bear a rational
relation to the State's proferred justifications of protection of hospi-
tality and elimination of collusive lawsuits. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.
3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal Rptr. 388 (1973).
According to common law principles, the owner of an automobile
owes a guest the duty to use ordinary care in the operation of an
automobile.5 As hitchhiking became popular during the late 'twenties
and 'thirties, however, state legislatures altered this rule by enacting
52. Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE L.J. 425, 426, citing P.
WALD, LAW AND POvERTY: 1965 at 6 n.13 (1965).
1. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West 1960):
No person riding in or occuping a vehicle owned by him and driven by another
person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride In any
vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the ve-
hicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver
on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the
ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death
proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.
2. Id.
'. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 11, 21.
4. .TJS. CoNST. amend. XIV.
5. 2 HARPER & JAMES, The Law of Torts, § 16.15 at 950 (1956).
